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Abstract 
Usable security user studies as well as the number of successful attacks to end users’ data and 
devices show that today’s security interventions like the green URL bar and self-signed 
certificate warnings do not protect end users effectively for many reasons. To improve the 
situation, we proposed the Framework fOr Contextualized security Interventions (FOCI). 
While this framework provides general guidelines how to develop contextualized security 
interventions, this is the first paper in which this framework is applied to actually develop 
adequate security intervention strategies and intervention content. We focus on a subset of 
security- and privacy-critical scenarios in the context of web applications – namely those in 
which users visit web pages containing a password filed. If either the communication is not 
confidential and authenticated or the service behind the web page is not trustworthy, entering a 
password can have consequences like financial loss and privacy leakage in particular for users 
reusing their passwords for several different web pages. Therefore, it is important to provide 
effective security interventions for these scenarios.  
Keywords 
Security intervention, human aspects, contextualized, https, secure password 
transmission, intervention strategy, threats, consequences, risks. 
1. Introduction 
Many user studies and statistics concerning successful attacks against end users show 
that neither current passive interventions (like the green URL bar in case of an 
extended SSL certificate) nor (active warnings like those in cased of self-signed 
certificates) do effectively protect their users (Dhamija et al. 2006, Sunshine et al. 
2009). Researchers have identified several reasons. The main reason is that existing 
interventions do not adequately take into account that security is not their primary 
task but e.g. transferring money or buying books (West 2008, Sasse et al. 2001) and 
that the user’s mental model and knowledge of Internet security is incomplete 
(Bravo-Lillo et al. 2011b). For instance, many users believe that they personally are 
not of interest for an attacker (Sasse et al. 2012). Studies also show that people tend 
to base the decision whether to use or not to use a web page on the design of the web 
page and not on (passive) security interventions (Fogg et al. 2001, Schechter et al. 
2006). In general one can say that existing passive security interventions are not 
noticed by most of the users. Active security interventions interrupt users from their 
primary task and can therefore not be overlooked. However, active warnings are not 
much more effective for many reasons; as for instances Sunshine et al. (2009) show.  
One problem is that the communicated information about the situation or reason for 
this intervention is currently on a very technical level. Thus, users are not able to 
deduce the risk and their personal consequences of ignoring this intervention from 
the provided information (Bravo-Lillo et al. 2011a and Kauer et at. 2012). In 
combination with the fact that browsers show the same security interventions in high 
and in low risk situations, users learned from many low risk situations in their daily 
lives that nothing “bad” happens if they ignore these interventions (Sotirakopoulos et 
al. 2011, Sunshine et al. 2009). Correspondingly, it is not surprising that - due to 
habituation effects - users will also ignore such interventions in high risk situations. 
In order to improve the situation, Bartsch and Volkamer (2012) proposed the 
Framework fOr Contextualized security Interventions (FOCI). The main idea is that 
the appearance of an intervention (intervene or not), the time, type and position of 
the intervention (all this is defined in the intervention strategy), and the content of an 
intervention is primarily influenced by the user’s context. The context is defined by 
the user’s personal characteristics and the situation (what do we know about the web 
page, the connection to the web server, and the operator of the web page or web 
service). The authors left it for future work to operationalize this very general 
framework with respect to the different existing security-critical contexts.  
In this paper, we focus on security-critical scenarios in the context of web pages with 
password fields (e.g. password requests over http or over https with self-signed 
certificates) and describe the proposed algorithm to determine whether to intervene 
and how (passive or active, as well as position). The reason to start with these 
scenarios is, on the one hand, that many of the common phishing attacks are covered 
with these scenarios and, on the other hand, the fact that many users reuse passwords 
between different services. Consequently, being able to “phish” one password often 
enables the attacker to get access to several web services. The proposed interventions 
strategy combines and extends existing approaches for security interventions; namely 
the multi-page warning approach proposed by Sunshine et al. (2009) and extended 
by Seikel (2012) and the idea from Maurer et al. (2011a and b) to display warnings 
only if the user starts entering sensitive data and place the warning right where the 
data is entered.  
2. Framework fOr Contextualized security Interventions 
The main idea of the framework proposed by Bartsch and Volkamer (2012) is that 
the intervention strategy including the appearance of an intervention (intervene or 
not), the time, type and position of the intervention (all this is defined in the 
intervention strategy), as well as the content of an intervention is primarily 
influenced by the concrete situation and personal characteristics (see Figure 1).  
Situation indicators include security-related indicators which enable the framework 
to measure the security in a particular situation based on indicators like the 
trustworthiness of the operator of the web service, the protection of the 
communication path to the web service, the requested data (e.g. passwords, credit 
cards or other sensible data), the type of web page (information pages versus online 
banking), the user’s intention (whether to provide this data or not), and whether the 
user visited the same URL already in past. Other situation indicators are so called 
user-influencing indicators. Examples are professional design or containing logos 
from trustworthy institutions but also the type of web page and the requested data. 
Personal characteristics include the user’s demographics, user’s mental model and 
knowledge of Internet and computer/mobile security as well as his risk profile. The 
risk profile defines the readiness to assume a risk in different situations.  
The framework requires an interdisciplinary collaboration from security and 
psychology researchers in order to deduce adequate contextualized intervention 
strategies and content. Thereby, FOCI includes results from Sunshine et al. (2009) 
and Cranor (2008). Sunshine et al. (2009) already indicate that the effectiveness of 
warnings can be improved, if the content and the intensity are adjusted to the specific 
context, while context in their paper mainly includes the type of web page the user 
visits. Cranor proposed (2008) a human-in-the-loop security framework, which 
describes which factors influence users, namely “personal variables“ such as the 
user’s demographics, “intentions“ as the user’s attitudes and believe, and 
“capabilities“ for the user's knowledge or cognitive and physical skills. 
Correspondingly, also according to Cranor (2008) different warnings are necessary. 
 
Figure 1: Framework for contextualized Security Interventions 
FOCI should support developers in developing an algorithm to deduce for individual 
situations and users the appropriated intervention strategy and the appropriate 
content if an intervention is displayed which allows conveying content. Such an 
algorithm can either be integrated in future Browsers or available as an add-on.  
As input for the algorithm both disciplines need to identify and weigh relevant 
situation indicators and personal characteristics, respectively. Based on these 
indicators the psychologists develop an algorithm to predict the user’s decision 
without any further intervention (the idea is not to replace existing passive 
interventions, like the green URL bar). The idea is to only confront the user with 
additional passive or active interventions if the user would make an unintentional 
risky decision without. Security experts need to develop algorithms to deduce the 
overall risk level, possible abstract consequences and their likelihoods based on the 
identified security related indicators. Bartsch and Volkamer (2012) recommend to 
conduct user studies, literature reviews and to consult experts both to identify and 
weighing situation indicators and personal characteristics. In addition, for each of the 
situation indicators, researchers need to define how these indicators can be deduced. 
It is recommended that ideally the user is only involved in the setup phase of such a 
tool by answering some questions concerning his personal characteristics and web 
pages he has accounts for. Note, already in this stage such a tool would check 
whether the provided URLs/domains are critical with respect to password 
transmissions. Therefore, after the setup phase, it can be assumed that on these web 
pages either no problem exists or the user accepts this risk.  
Correspondingly, situation indicators are ideally automatically deduced when 
visiting a web page. In Bartsch and Volkamer (2012), it is recommended to conduct 
a cost benefit analysis when thinking of involving the user in determining situation 
indicators, e.g. by asking him what type of web page he tries to access or whether he 
plans to login on this page. Correspondingly, it is recommended to first evaluate all 
the situation indicators which can automatically be determined and all information 
from the setup phase. Then it needs to be decided whether the intervention strategy 
and content can be based on this information or whether additional information is 
required to support the user adequately. As the number of possible combinations of 
situation indicators and personal characteristics is large, it is recommended to start 
with concrete scenarios. In this paper we operationalized a first set of concrete 
scenarios, that is, visiting web pages with password requests (password fields appear 
on the web page).  We focus on the strategy rather than on the content. 
3. Adapted approaches for proposed strategy 
For the operationalization of our framework we integrate, combine, adapt, and refine 
the results from the following papers: In 2009, Sunshine et al. introduced the concept 
of multi-page warnings. The idea is, once the browser detects a security risk, a first 
dialog asks the user which type of web page he wants to visit. Depending on his 
choice, the user is either shown a warning or not. With this multi-page warning 
approach, the authors wanted to achieve, that the warning is only shown if the user 
stated that he wants to reach a web page with a higher criticality (which was either 
“Bank or other financial institution” or “Online store or other e-commerce website”). 
One main result of the study is that multi-page warnings are a promising approach 
for future frameworks. Seikel, (2012) extended this work by systematically 
identifying a set of seven web page categories for the dialog. The author further 
proposes to provide the user the option to store this assignment of the corresponding 
URL. In addition, it is proposed that, if the user selects the option ‘information web 
pages’ but, then he, later on, tries to login on this page, he is warned again.  
The second promising approach in improving the effectiveness of browser security 
warnings, in particular in the context of phishing, was proposed by Maurer et al. in 
(2011a and b). The main idea is to only show the warning when the user starts 
entering sensitive data and at the precise spot of the browser where the data is 
entered. Note, their plug-in disables the original SSL browser warnings. Thus the 
user is able to visit web pages without being warned even if the browser detects any 
problems with SSL. Showing these so called “semi-blocking” warnings is a very 
interesting approach, while it underlies the same problem as the passive security 
indicators: Namely, if the ‘look and feel’ of the web page appeals to the user, it is 
more likely that he will continue entering sensitive data, despite the warning as 
shown by Gutmann (2011).  
4. Situation indicators and personal characteristics 
In this section, situation indicators and relevant personal characteristics are 
identified. Furthermore, it is explained how these indicators can be deduced. 
Security related indicators. In order to identify the possible consequences and the 
risk in a particular situation, we need to identify first the relevant security related 
indicators for the considered password transmission scenarios. We systematically 
reviewed important security, Web, and HCI conferences for papers on Web security 
measures and identified the following security indicators:  
 contains password field: Yes / No? 
 https: Yes / No? 
 valid certificate: Yes / No? 
 self-signed: Yes / No?  
 CA known: Yes / No? 
 trustworthiness rating from external services for this web page such as Web 
of Trust, McAfee SiteAdvisor, and google safe browsing. 
In order to deduce possible (enabling) threats and consequences as well as the risk 
level the following information is required according to the literature: 
 User’s intention to login 
 Type of web page: Seikel (2012) systematically deduced the following 
seven types which we use for this paper:  Information Site, Shopping, 
Online Banking, Social Network, Email, Data Exchange, and Others.   
While the first list of security indicators can be automatically deduced, the last two 
indicators are more difficult to elaborate on. In worse case the user would be 
bothered with two corresponding questions whenever visiting a web page containing 
a password field and failing for any of the other security related indicators. 
Obviously, these costs are too high as users would be very likely to uninstall the tool. 
However, the tool can take the list of web pages listed in the setup phase into account 
and assuming that he only logs in on these pages. Furthermore, it can learn from 
previous actions (including creating new accounts) or decisions of a user on 
particular web pages, i.e. store this information in a history. Thus, once the user has 
answered the question about user’s intention and type of web page for a particular 
URL or domain, this is stored and is used as input next time the same web page is 
visited. This reduces the number of interactions a lot. Therefore, we consider the  
 ‘URL/domain – login – web page type‘ history  
as further security related indicator.  
Furthermore, natural language processing (NLP) techniques are proposed to be 
integrated to deduce the type of web page. Note, such a solution would in some cases 
come to its limits: For instance ‘www.google.com’ provides many different services, 
with different criticalities and different consequences. For example, on the one hand 
Google can only be used as a search engine, and on the other hand it provides email 
services and a social network.   
 
User influencing indicators. We systematically reviewed important security, Web, 
and HCI conferences for papers on user influencing factors. The main user 
influencing factor (if no warning is shown) is the design of the page (Fogg et al. 
2001, Schechter et al. 2006). Furthermore, (Fogg et al. 2001) showed that user 
consider the type of web page. However, the type has not necessarily an influence in 
the same direction; i.e. some users are more concerned and more careful on e-
banking pages as others are less because they for instance believe the bank takes care 
of their security. Similar to the type of web page it also has an influence whether the 
user knows the company. Correspondingly, the user influencing indicators are: 
 Design of the web page (similarity to known pages, general design) 
 Type of web page  
 User knows the company/service 
In order to get the impression about the design and thereby the trustworthiness of this 
particular user it would be necessary to ask the user. As the costs are obviously too 
high to ask him for each web page potentially causing threats and containing a 
password field, this needs to be automatically deduced (as far as possible and even if 
this will not exactly match to the user’s impression). We propose to analyse whether 
the web page looks similar to one of the pages the user has an account at (known 
from the setup phase or the history) and take this similarity aspect as user influencing 
indicator. In addition, we propose to extend web accessibility evaluation tools to use 
them to automatically deduce the general design quality of the web page.  
The challenges and possible solutions to deduce the web page type, we discussed 
already with the security related indicators and refer the reader there.  
Which companies are known by the individual user can only be answered by the user 
itself. Of course one can consider here again those pages he has an account at (from 
the setup phase and history). In addition, one could think of the TOP 100 visited web 
pages but it is not known whether these are also known to most of the popularity. 
Correspondingly, we propose to only take companies from the setup phase and the 
history into account to decide whether someone knows this company/service or not. 
Personal characteristics. The effect each influencing factor has (more likely to 
ignore intervention or not) depends on the personal characteristics. According to the 
literature these are age, education, ownership, Internet/security knowledge, Internet 
usage (which applications, since when, and how often), and number of web-enabled 
devices; as well as situation specific once: namely the perceived risk, expected 
benefit, and the rating of expected risk. This is obviously a rather complicated field. 
Thus, we take only scenario specific characteristics into account which are: 
 Risk ranking of different web page types (as part of their mental model) 
 Knowledge about passwords 
We propose the following approach to collect this information: users are ask in the 
setup phase to sort different web page types according to the risk they perceive if 
someone else has access to their account on this web page. In addition, users are 
asked to participate in a small quiz in order to distinguish between experts and 
laypersons; while experts are those who know about the consequences if passwords 
are transmitted unencrypted or to an unauthorized service; and who use different and 
where recommended secure passwords. This will result in a very small group of 
experts however for the strategy whether to interfere or not it should be sufficient to 
distinguish these two groups. If we later also consider the type of intervention then 
we might need to distinguish between more groups. Note, the development of such a 
quiz as well as the question whether more groups are adequate is left for future work.  
 
5. Weighing security related indicators and decision prediction 
Threats, Consequences, and Risk. Assuming, all the security related indicators can 
be determined (automatically or by asking), then according to FOCI, the next step is 
to deduce possible (enabling) threats and consequences as well as objective risk 
levels. Note, we consider here only those URLs that are not contained in the setup 
list and not in the history file. Those are treated differently: The tool only intervenes 
if one of the security-relevant indicators changes.  
We propose in Table 1 risk levels for different results for different security-critical 
indicators while assuming we know the user’s intention is to login (L – Low, M – 
Medium, H – High, and X is the risk level according to the other services). If more 
than one of the five indicators about the connection to the server and the server itself 
fail then this results in the highest risk assigned to any of these indicators. Note, this 
table is based on our own opinion while it is recommended in future to ask several 
experts to fill out this table and compute the average risk level per entry. 
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Table 1: Risk level 
The possible (enabling) threat if logging in is for all cases identity theft at this 
account and if the same password is used for other accounts at these accounts as 
well. Possible consequences are: attacker gets access to private data (e.g. shopping 
history, salary, photos, and email history), losing money, and different types of 
nuisance. Note, we will investigate more in the concrete consequences when 
developing proposals for the content of interventions in future.  
Decision prediction. The algorithm needs to take into account the personal 
characteristics and the user influencing indicators. From the literature it is not 
possible to predict the decision based on corresponding input data. It is rather likely 
that experts would verify that https in place when logging in on an e-banking or e-
shopping page independent from the design and whether they know the company or 
not. However, as there is no paper that clearly states this, we recommend conducting 
a corresponding user study for clarification as future work.  For this paper, we 
assume that everyone would log in on any web page based on the existing passive 
warnings and if not active warning appears. Thus, it is necessary to support the user 
with additional security interventions.  
6. Intervention strategy 
General strategy. While all users need support in detecting potentially critical 
password transmissions, laypersons also need information about the situation and 
consequences if deciding to login despite the warning. Thus, we propose to use 
passive interventions for experts (as this seems to be sufficient in many situations) 
and active once for laypersons. Note, as such we would also educate users. As the 
consequence, the number of active interventions can be reduced over time as 
laypersons learn more and more about the consequences in different situations. 
Algorithm description: we propose the following steps: 
 Security check (password field and any other security indicator) 
o If at least one causes a problem continue 
 Check history/setup for intention and type 
o If in history compare whether security decreased 
 If increased warn 
 If not reaction according to setting in history 
o If not continue 
 Get web page type from NLP check with corresponding probability 
 Get personal characteristics from setup 
Afterwards it needs to be decided whether it is necessary to ask the user about his 
intention and the type of webpage. For experts (CASE 1.E) we propose to use only a 
passive indicator namely a red background colour for the password field. However, 
once the user clicks on the password fields and starts entering a password a warning 
according to the proposal of Maurer et al. in (2011a and b) will appear. Note, the 
content of this active intervention will be different from Maurer et al.’s proposal.  
For laypersons (CASE 1.L), the tool proceeds in the same manner as for (CASE 1.E) 
if the result of the NLP check is ‘information page’ with a high probability. 
If the NLP check results for a layperson in one of the other five web page types with 
a high probability (CASE 2), the user will see a dialog mentioning that there might 
be a security risk and asking whether the user plans to log in. If he answers yes 
(CASE 2.YES), the tool displays a warning informing about the concrete risk and 
consequences when logging in. Note, the consequence will depend on the type of 
web page. If the user answers no (CASE 2.NO), the background colour of the 
password field is set to red like in (CASE 1.E) and the tool is set into a `read only' 
mode (which is not visible to the user) according to Seidel (2012). In this status the 
user is able to surf at this domain and read and search for information without being 
disturbed. But when he tries to login, a warning pop-up is displayed at the precise 
spot of the browser where the data is entered, again, according to the proposal of 
Maurer et al. in (2011a and b). The warning reminds the user of the dialog displayed 
earlier and inform the user about the risks and consequences if he decides to login. 
Afterwards he can still decide whether to login. With this third stage we also address 
the problem of false positives because the second warning would appear very rarely 
and so, the effect of habituation is avoided. 
If the NLP check is not able to deduce the type of web page (CASE 3), lay persons 
are asked first whether they intent to log in similar to (CASE 2). If the answer is no 
(CASE 3.NO) the tool will continue as in (CASE 2.N). If the answer is yes (CASE 
3.YES), the user is asked in a second dialog on which web page type he tries to 
login. Next the tool displays the same type of warning as in (CASED 2.YES).  
Note, within all dialogs and warnings the user can store the answer in the history for 
this domain/URL.  
7. Conclusion and Future Work 
We started operationalizing the Framework fOr Contextualized security 
Interventions. We focused on password requesting scenarios. According to the 
framework, we identified security relevant indicators, user influencing indicators and 
relevant personal characteristics. We further described how these indicators can be 
deduced from the context and in the setup phase. Afterwards, we proposed an 
algorithm to identify threats, consequences and the risk as well as a simplified 
algorithm to predict the user’s decision without intervening. Finally, the intervention 
strategy was proposed. 
As future research, we will use FOCI to deduce systematically content for the 
security interventions. Here, we will take existing literature into account, e.g. Kauer 
et al. (2012) who observed that the wording of warnings should address the personal 
risk of the user and possible concrete consequences; and  Raja et al. (2011) who 
showed that physical mental models helps improving the efficiency and 
understandability of computer warnings. In a next step, the tool should also provide 
recommendations how to proceed; e.g. in the situation that users already have an 
account on this page, need to get access to the data, or even might notice that they 
use the same password for another security critical web service. In addition, we will 
have a closer look on those web pages on which the user cannot login on the first 
page but only on subpages, e.g. after having made selections what to buy. Note, 
currently, the tool would only be activated once the page with the password field is 
loaded which makes it according to Gutmann (2011) harder for the tool to convince 
the user that there is a problem when logging in. Finally, we will integrate learning 
mechanisms, i.e. that the strategy and content is adopted over time as we expect 
people to learn how to behave more securely. Afterwards, the proposed algorithm 
will be implemented as add-on for Firefox and then tested in a lab study and later in 
a field study. 
8. References 
Bartsch, S. and Volkamer, M. (2012). “Towards the Systematic Development of 
Contextualized Security Interventions”. In Designing Interactive Secure Systems, BCS HCI 
2012, BCS eWiC repository.  
Bravo-Lillo, C., Cranor, L.F., Downs, J., Komanduri, S. (2011a).“Bridging the gap in 
computer security warnings: A mental model approach”. IEEE Security and Privacy, pages 
18-26. 
Bravo-Lillo, C., Cranor, L. F., Downs, J., Komanduri, S., Sleeper, M. (2011b). “Improving 
computer security dialogs”. In Proceedings of the 13th IFIP TC 13 international conference on 
Human-computer interaction – Volume Part IV, INTERACT'11, pages 18-35. Springer. 
Cranor, L. F. (2008). “A framework for reasoning about the human in the loop”. In  
Proceedings of the 1st Conference on Usability, Psychology, and Security, pages 1-15.  
Dhamija, R. , Tygar, J. D. , Hearst M. (2006). “Why phishing works”. In: Proceedings of the 
SIGCHI conference on Human Factors in computing systems, pages 581-590. ACM.  
Fogg, B. J. , Marshall, J., Laraki, O., Osipovich, A., Varma, C., Fang, N., Paul, J. , Rangnekar, 
A., Shon, J., Swani P., Treinen, M. (2001).„What makes web sites credible?: a report on a 
large quantitative study”. In Proceedings of SIGCHI conference, pages 61-68. ACM. 
Gutmann, P. (2011). “Security and usability fundamentals”. http://static.googleusercontent. 
com/external_content/untrusted_dlcp/research.google.com/de//pubs/archive/32872.pdf 
(Accessed 02/ 2013). 
Kauer, M., Pfeiffer, T., Volkamer, M., Theuerling, H., Bruder, R. (2012). „It is not about the 
design - it is about the content! Making warnings more efficient by communicating risks 
appropriately”. GI Sicherheit 2012, pages 187-198. 
Maurer, M.-E. , De Luca, A, Hussmann, H. (2011a). “Data type based security alert dialogs”. 
In: Proceedings of the 2011 annual conference extended abstracts on Human factors in 
computing systems, CHI EA '11, pages 2359-2364. ACM. 
Maurer, M.-E., De Luca, A., Kempe, S. (2011b). “Using data type based security alert dialogs 
to raise online security awareness”. In: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium on Usable 
Privacy and Security, SOUPS '11, pages 2:1-2:13. ACM. 
Raja, F., Hawkey, K., Hsu, S., Wang, K.-L., Beznosov, K. (2011). “Promoting a physical 
security mental model for personal firewall warnings”. In annual conference extended 
abstracts on Human factors in computing systems, pages 1585-1590. ACM.  
Sasse, M. A. , Brostoff, S. . Weirich, D. (2001). “Transforming the 'Weakest Link' -  a 
Human/Computer Interaction Approach to Usable and Effective Security”. In  Technology 
Journal, Vol. 19, No. 3. pages. 122-131. 
Sasse, M. A., Krol, K., Moroz, M.(2012) "Don't work. Can't work? Why it's time to rethink 
security warnings”, 7th Intern. Conf. on Risks & Security of Internet & Systems, pages 1-8. 
Schechter, S. E., Dhamija, R., Ozment, A., Fischer, I. (2007). „Emperor's new security 
indicators: An evaluation of website authentication and the effect of role playing on usability 
studies”. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. 
Seikel, C. (2012), “Categorization of websites according to the risk during usage” 
Bachelorthesis, Technische Universität Darmstadt. 
Sotirakopoulos, A., Hawkey, K., Beznosov, K. (2011).“On the challenges in usable security 
lab studies: Lessons learned from replicating a study on SSL warnings”. In: the Seventh 
Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, ACM. 
Sunshine, J., Egelman, S., Almuhimedi, H., Atri, N., Cranor, L. F. (2009). “Crying wolf: an 
empirical study of SSL warning effectiveness”. In: Proceedings of the 18th conference on 
USENIX security symposium, pages 399-416. 
West R. (2008). “The psychology of security”. Commuication of ACM 51, 4; pages 34-40.  
